Robert McNamara Dies

One of the giants - for better and for worse - of twentieth century American foreign policy passed away today. Robert McNamara, the Secretary of Defense in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, and one of the most powerful men in the U.S. government during the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the military escalation in Vietnam, was 93.

The most consequential events of McNamara's life and tenure preceded my birth by some years, so my perspective is admittedly colored by the foggy lens of history. I'm sure my parents, who remember the Cuban Missile Crisis and who had friends die in Southeast Asia, view his legacy in ways that are much more alive to the ethical and personal ramifications of his leadership. Still, for what they're worth, here are my immediate thoughts.

McNamara, to me, has always seemed to be the truest embodiment of both the greatness and the folly of the American character. It is perhaps instructive that, apart from his service in government, McNamara's most notable accomplishments were in the automotive industry during the golden age of its power (he was, very briefly, the CEO of Ford). His belief that people, through rationality and force of will, could understand, shape and tame the immensely complex systems that rule our world is quintessentially American in its ambition and scope. The inability of American power, forcefully applied and dexterously directed though it was, to achieve U.S. objectives in Vietnam is painfully illustrative of the hubris that often accompanies such ambition. That McNamara, through his experiences, was eventually able to change his mindset and recognize the limitations of even the resources at his disposal - even if it was too late to change the minds of others invested in his folly - betrays a capacity for self-criticism that we should seek out in all our leaders.

I don't say this to heap undue praise on McNamara. The fact is, for all his intelligence and ability, he led the United States into an unnecessary quagmire that scarred a generation and resulted in tens of thousands of Americans coming home in bags. Again, my age and perspective handicaps my ability to pass an informed ethical judgment on the man's legacy. I've always been a particular fan of Errol Morris's long-form interview with McNamara, "The Fog of War." Though I agree with Robert Farley that Morris didn't press his subject on some crucial issues, I think the film contains useful reflections on the nature of American power and the dangers of overestimating the indispensability of Americn action. It also contains one of the more succinct and eloquent cases I've heard for eliminating nuclear weapons. To balance some of the film's softballs, I'd recommend reading David Halberstam's The Best and the Brightest, Barbara Tuchman's The March of Folly and Timothy Weiner's Legacy of Ashes.

Laying aside judgment of the man himself, though, his legacy provides the opportunity to reflect on how and why the United States acts in the world. To what extent do the preconceptions of American leaders, and the strengths and handicaps of American institutions, lead the United States to success or failure? To what end do we seek out demons to slay abroad? How does the American public perceive America's interests, and how does our democracy translate that perception into action? If that process leads to distortions, how can they be corrected before political and institutional inertia makes tragedy inevitable? McNamara's time in office provides students of history and public policy with prime material to grapple with such questions. They remain extraordinarily important.

Potential for Israeli Flights Over Saudi Arabia

Okay, so this news slightly changes the extent to which Israel would absolutely require a U.S. green light for a strike on Iran, though it would still probably be important. It also emphasizes the extent to which Biden's remarks might have been the beginning of an effort to distance Washington from Israeli actions. The possibility that America might lack the leverage to stop an Israeli attack would certainly seem to call for such an effort. I doubt, though, that it would be very successful. All the more reason that it would be really good if Israel didn't attack Iran.

Standing in the Way

Vice President Biden made headline news today when, in a taped interview with George Stephanopolous, he seemed to indicate that the United States would not stand in the way of an Israeli strike against Iran's nuclear program. When asked specifically about the possibility of Israeli military action against Iran, he said the United States "cannot dictate to another sovereign nation what they can and cannot do when they make a determination — if they make a determination — that they’re existentially threatened and their survival is threatened by another country." This seems to indicate more openness to the idea of an Israeli strike than other senior U.S. officials have expressed.

I'm still digesting this, and I'm sure there will be a whole mess of prognostications in the next few days as to what, if anything, the VP's comments mean and why he made them, but my off-the-cuff impression is that his remarks could reflect any combination of the following possibilities:

1) Biden chose his words poorly and communicated a change in emphasis without meaning to. Given his past propensity to make such blunders, this is certainly a possibility. In my mind, though, it's tempered by a couple of things. First, Stephanopolous gave him the opportunity to clarify his remarks, and he didn't backtrack. Second, while Biden has made some notable gaffes in the course of campaigning, and while his somewhat artless choices of words have at times gotten him into trouble domestically, he's generally more careful in the area of foreign policy. He's always struck me as being acutely attuned to the intricacies of international diplomacy, and I seriously doubt he'd make a statement on such a sensitive issue without considering its implications. My bet, then, is that he was being deliberate.

2) By emphasizing Israeli sovereingty, Biden was trying to both combat the notion that Israel is a U.S. puppet and client state, as well as distance the U.S. from some of the political consequences of an Israeli strike. If the Administration is afraid that Tel Aviv is going to hit Iran's nuclear facilities irrespective of America's wishes, it's probably not a bad idea to emphasize that Israel, not the United States, is the ultimate arbiter of what the IDF does. Given the extent to which Israeli and U.S. policy has become conflated in the minds of many Middle Easterners, I think Biden might be whistling past the graveyard on this score, but the effort can't hurt.

3) By emphasizing Israeli sovereignty, Biden was reminding the rest of the world (Europe and Russia in particular) that an Israeli strike, which would almost certainly be harmful to Middle Eastern stability and European interests, remains a real possibility absent the international community showing some solidarity and muscle in negotiations with Tehran.

4) By emphasizing Israeli sovereignty, Biden was trying to calm frayed nerves in Tel Aviv and signal to the Israelis that the U.S. hasn't simply decided to push them around.

5) Without making the more explicit threats of his predecessor and his predecessor's boss, Biden was trying to signal to Tehran that military options remain "on the table." This wouldn't really represent a change in policy so much as a reminder of existing policy, but tone is important in such matters.

I'm sure there are possibilities that I'm missing here. The other salient fact, of course, is that an Israeli strike on Iran's nuclear facilities would be very technically difficult, and would be even more technically difficult without a green light from the United States, which controls key airspace over which IDF jets would likely have to fly. The question, then, is what it means for the United States to "stand in the way" of Israel. If it means telling Tel Aviv that, hey, you'll do what you have to do, but your jets won't be flying over Iraqi airspace, thent the U.S. would be making Israel's life difficult. If, on the other hand, Washington signals to Tel Aviv that it won't make a stink over a few hundred sorties that get to Iran via Iraq, that's another story. That is the equivalent of an American green light, and it would be perceived as such by the rest of the world. At that point, the political fallout for the U.S. would likely be almost as severe as if the American military itself participated in the attack.

Like it or not, by virtue of its position in Iraq, the United States is already "standing in the way" of an Israeli strike on Iran. The question is whether it will move to the side or not. Unfortunately, if Tel Aviv decides to attack Iran, it's not a decision of which American leaders will be able to wash their hands.

Is Rahm Emanuel anti-Israeli? Netanyahu might be thinking so

On Friday, the daily paper Maariv published a quote (Hebrew) from a source close to Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu, claiming that Netanyahu is convinced that the person responsible for some of his troubles with the new American administration is none other than the White House Chief of Stuff, Rahm Emanuel. Netanyahu, said the source, is convinced that Emanuel is "polluting the atmosphere" against him. A very undiplomatic phrase indeed.

The obvious irony is that the appointment of Emanuel, a son of an Israeli and a known supporter of Israel, was praised by Jewish organizations and Israeli officials alike, while some Arab commentators considered it as a bad sign for the future. It is also hard to forget the ugly remark by Rahm's father, Benjamin Emanuel, regarding the role his son would play in the WH. "[Rahm will] obviously influence the president to be pro-Israel," the father reportedly said, "Why shouldn’t he? What is he, an Arab? He’s not going to be mopping floors at the White House.”

All things considered, I think that Rahm Emanuel is pro-Israeli, but he is also pro-American and Pro-Obama, and therefore reflects the new administration's policies. There is something childish about Netanyahu's attitude to the whole matter. It seems that more than anything else, the PM, and other politicians and pundits here in Israel with him, are not just concerned by the tension with Washington, they are offended. It is actually hard for them to accept that what they perceive as "a cold shoulder" from our supposed-to-be-friends in Washington is not a personal insult, but rather an understandable change of policy, based on a different evaluation of the current situation than that of the previous administration.

Trade Sanctions, Energy and Climate Change

Yesterday, the Times reported that President Obama has expressed opposition to a provision of the Waxman-Markey climate change bill (summary) that would compel the President, starting in 2020, to begin imposing trade barriers against countries that don't act to limit carbon emissions. The Times article frames the provision as a matter of domestic politics, with representatives from rust belt states wanting to make sure that what remains of the American industrial economy doesn't take further body blows from climate change legislation. The Obama administration, which has been rhetorically ambivilent on trade issues, but which has so far hewn fairly closely to the free trade consensus of the past quarter-century, expressed reservations out of a fear that such moves would spark protectionist impulses worldwide.

Obviously, creating some kind of global regime around the issue of climate change and alternative energy is enormously complex, requiring technological and economic expertise beyond that of the informed layman, but here are my thoughts for what they're worth:

I think that, at a tactical level, the Obama Administration is probably correct that sending even modest protectionist signals right now is very dangerous. We're in the worst global economic crisis since the Great Depression, and the global trade regime that has underpinned much of the world's economic growth since the end of the Cold War sits on a knife's edge in many countries. Playing with protectionism under such circumstances is playing with fire, so I think now's probably not the time to be rewriting the rules.

That said, in the long term I don't see any way to bring about a broad-based global shift away from hydrocarbons without linking it to global trade. Putting aside the economic health of the rust belt, the health of the planet depends on countries like China, India, Russia and Brazil moving away from fossil fuels as they develop, rather than waiting until they've attained OECD living standards before making the shift. Many in those countries feel, with some justification, that forcing them to, in effect, pay for the sins of the West, which was able to pollute with impunity for two centuries, is unfair. That said, the world can't handle another fifty years of Chinese coal-fired power plants belching carbon and sulfur into the atmosphere, irrespective of what Europe and the United States do. The only way I can see to square that circle is to convince China, and the rest of the developing world, that their GDP will suffer more in both the short and long term from a refusal to change than from imposing energy regulations.

All this to say that while the timing of the Waxman-Markey provision might be problematic, the overall gist of the legislation is right on.

'Weakening the Regime'

One of the things that has always bugged me about those who counsel confrontation and military action as a means of dealing with problematic countries - unfortunately still a large group of people - is the certainty with which they treat the idea that confrontations between weaker powers and stronger powers are likely to enfeeble the regimes of the former and further the objectives of the latter.

Jeffrey Goldberg provided a wonderful example of this tendency the other day. While making the otherwise sensible point that the recent crisis has exposed Khamenei et al. as venal autocrats interested in self-preservation rather than fanatics interested in martyrdom, he fires off the following gem:

I think there's an argument to be made that Khamenei and Ahmadinejad are grubby men mainly interested in perpetuating their power. In other words, they seem to behave like rather quotidian dictators, not religious fanatics. A confrontation with Israel would certainly threaten the stability of their regime, and the stability of their regime is something they quite obviously cherish.

Why is it that a confrontation with Israel would threaten the stability of the Iranian regime? What evidence can he marshal to support that conclusion? Looking back through history, I can find precious few instances where regimes, even fragile ones, have been toppled through military or political confrontation with outside powers. The Argentinian junta and the Falklands crisis in the '80s might work as an example, and I'd be open to hearing others, but the weight of historical evidence is tilted very much against the idea that confrontation weakens a sitting regime. Going back to the pan-European intervention against revolutionary France in 1789, outside attacks tend to rally popular support for a country's military (the organ of state that opposition movements generally need to either weaken or co-opt), emphasize the importance of national unity, and expose internal opposition members to charges of aiding foreign enemies.

Obviously, there are times when international conflict has weakened or even toppled regimes, but this tends to happen in cases of large-scale war when foreign armies actually invade and remove those in power (as with the Nazis at the end of World War II) or when a war drags on for so long, and at such high cost, that feelings of patriotism have time to subside under the daily grind of death and privation (as with the Czarist regime at the end of World War I). So, if Mr. Goldberg is suggesting that the United States or Israel mount a full-scale invasion of Iran, or start a years' long war of attrition with Iran, then fine I suppose. I don't think that's a particularly good or feasible idea, nor does most anyone else (including, I suspect, Mr. Goldberg), but it's at least consistent with the chain of causation he's proposing. If that's not what he means, though, then it's on him to explain why he thinks a confrontation will weaken, rather than bolster, the Iranian regime.

Engagement With a Very Confusing Iran

As about a million others have pointed out, the ongoing events in Iran present some very delicate problems for U.S. policy, and for the means and nature of any future diplomatic engagment with Tehran. Before the upheavals of the past few weeks, those (myself included) who pressed for diplomatic openings to the Islamic Republic did so largely on the basis of pragmatism, not ethics. Yes, the argument went, the Iranian government is anti-democratic and repressive, but there's no indication that wholesale reform is in the offing any time soon, and we've got real strategic concerns that need to be resolved, so we should swallow our pride and sit down at the table. After all, we deal with the Saudis.

On the face of it, recent events shouldn't really change that calculus too much. Everyone knew the regime was repressive, and this, after all, is what repression looks like. Still, 'knowing' is one thing. Seeing people flood into the streets by the millions to demand their rights, only to be beaten, gassed and shot is something else. Strategic logic aside, there'd be something slightly grotesque about calling up an Iranian hard-line government that's still wiping its citizens' blood off the streets and asking for a sit-down. There's also a chance that recent events have put a dent in the tactical logic of negotiating with Tehran. As Yglesias points out, if the idea in opening negotiations is to try to nudge the regime in the direction of its own pragmatists, the polarization created by the ongoing internal conflict could well make that a dead end effort.

Still, there are other factors to consider. Obviously, events in Iran remain very, very fluid. Though it seems like the establishment has, for the moment, closed ranks around its hardliners, it's still tough to know what's really going on. Even if ongoing government crackdowns force protesters from the streets in the coming days, it may only be a tactical victory for the regime. People aren't, after all, simply going to forget what happened. Gary Sick points out that the revolution that overthrew the Shah, a rapid one by historical standards, played out over at least a year, with periods of calm and political maneuvering punctuated by episodes of major unrest. Even if the hard-liners seem to "win" over the next week or so, that doesn't necessarily mean the game's over. Some conservatives may feel that, after making a show of strength and violence, they need to make some concessions to establishment moderates in order to consolidate their position (for a rather obscure historical example, recall that Frederick Wilhelm IV of Prussia brutally put down popular revolt in 1848, only to cede absolute power and create a Constitution shortly thereafter). It likely won't be clear for a while what, if any, new political equilibrium emerges from the recent upheavals, so the U.S. should also be wary of simply writing off an opposition that seems to be temporarily quiescent.

So, what's the right approach? The fact remains that the Iranian nuclear program, Iranian support for Hamas and Hezbollah, Iranian activity in Iraq, and Iran's regional aspirations in general are of great importance to the United States, and they will be difficult to address without some kind of diplomatic engagement. While Yglesias is right that the recent repression will probably make such talks harder for American audiences to stomach, there's a silver lining in that the Iranian people themselves, so often treated as a unitary abstract monolith, have been humanized to CNN-watchers, and so it will probably also be harder for the public to stomach bombing them.

Given all the uncertainty about Iran's political future, the first U.S. priority ought to be to avoid hurting the cause of reform through getting too intimately involved in Iranian domestic politics. If the Obama Administration waits a while longer to allow for the political situation to stabilize, at least temporarily, I would imagine that diplomatic overtures to Tehran over "issues of mutual interest" or some such diplo-speak would at the very least pass the "do no harm" test, and might further undermine the notion that America is an implacable enemy that must always be vigorously opposed - a canard that remains the rhetorical bread and butter of Iran's hard-liners. It might also be helpful to begin, as Obama has, to back away from some of our more maximalist demands around the nuclear issue (zero enrichment) so as not to appear intransigent and and play into the hands of Iranian elements whose political status feeds off conflict with the West. Any final settlement with Iran will probably involve some kind of deal whereby enrichment is permitted, but with safeguards, so dropping hints in that direction isn't exactly a mortal concession to make.

Beyond that, as evidenced by the fact taht most of this post is written in the conditional tense, to me this is all very much Chinatown. For the sake of those in Iran we want to help, we should perhaps follow the film's advice as to what to do: as little as possible.

Everything has Changed in the Middle East

Let’s admit it – there is almost no reliable news as to what is actually happening in Iran. The pictures from the last couple of days don’t show the mass demonstrations of the first few days following the presidential elections. It seems that the number of protesters dropped from hundreds of thousands to just thousands and even hundreds. If this is so, it could be a bad sign for the reformist camp. On the other hand, the political heat is still on: Friday's warnings from he supreme leader Ali Khamenei not only failed to calm the streets, but seemed to toughen the position of the reformist leaders – Mousavi, Karubi, and above all, Rafsanjani. Again, most of the political drama is probably happening backstage, so we can’t know anything for sure.

Western leaders – probably under public pressure – are starting to take a more committed stand on the reformists’ side. Germany’s Angela Merkel took a firm position in support of the opposition, but the UK government and the American administration still chose their words very carefully. As I wrote before, too-overt support statements could end up doing do more harm than good, but on the other hand, when Iranians are calling “death to the dictator”, the careful language or president Obama seems somewhat out of sync with his inspiring speech in Cairo.

One thing is very clear right now – the Iranian “Islamic revolution” model has suffered a tremendous blow. Even if the Iranian leadership can sort the mess without sharing power with the reformists (something which doesn't seem very likely now), it is clear that the system as a whole doesn’t enjoy the legitimacy that everyone though it did. The Iranian leadership will have to be a lot more careful from now on, and concentrate on internal stability. It is not sure how much effort it will put on exporting the revolution, and on supporting Hamas and Hizbullah.

This doesn't mean that the Middle East will become more stable. On the contrary. Desperate leaders can be drawn to desperate acts, and a weak regime might be more dangerous than a strong one, as anyone watching the behavior of North Korea can surmise. But the new situation does create opportunities, both in Lebanon and in the Palestinian Territories.

In Lebanon, Hizbullah has already accepted electoral defeat. With the right support from the US, and the right pressure applied on Syria, there is a good chance of stabilizing the country even further, and even taking some steps toward solving the most difficult problem: how to get Hizbullah to surrender its weapons to the Lebanese army and become an ordinary - though powerful - political party.

With Hamas things are more complicated, and there is no hope of the organization giving away its arms or his power in Gaza. Diplomatic pressure won't do what the IDF couldn't during "Operation Cast Lead." The Israeli government will probably prefer to continue isolating the Gaza strip while negotiating with the Palestinian Authority (which controls the West Bank), but this is a dangerous game: when Hamas understands that the diplomatic game started without it, it will go back to firing rockets and sending suicide attacks from its remaining cells in the West Bank. This will kill the diplomatic process, just as it did in the Oslo days.

I believe the Hamas can't be ignored, as it represents an important part of Palestinian society. Now, that Iranian influence might weaken, there is a better chance of getting a power sharing agreement between the PLO and Hamas that will open the way for a renewal of the peace talks. The talks betwwen the two Palestinian organizations have already started in Egypt, but my guess is that nothing will happen before we get a better idea of the way things have tuned in Iran.

Altogether, In less than six months, incredible changes have happened in the Middle East. Historic elections took place in Lebanon; there was a change of leadership in Israel; a new American president has completely transformed the US policy in the region; and finally, Iran, the most enigmatic regime in the region, has reached it's most important crossroads since the Islamic revolution some thirty years ago.

And as they say, this is not even the end of the beginning.

Realism, Idealism, and Inter-War Foreign Policy

Matt Yglesias posted some interesting ruminations last week on the legacy of U.S. foreign policy between the wars. Anyone familiar with the founding fathers of Modern Realism, people like E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau and George Kennan, or even with the general popular-historical consensus on 1918-1941 policy-making, knows that the American orientation during that period is viewed dimly. Kennan once described the mindset of the era as "utopian in expectations, legalistic in concept, moralistic in [the] demand it seemed to place on others, and self-righteous in the degree of high-mindedness and rectitude... to ourselves." In other words, we foolishly believed that through moral suasion we could induce the nations of the world to behave as we thought all nations ought, thus securing for ourselves the illusion of responsible international action while maintaining our post-WWI isolationism. Then, so goes the general narrative, we were rudely shocked out of our complacency when the rise of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan rendered our idealistic diplomacy useless, and we were caught flat-footed when the world once again called us from our shores to oppose the banners of tyranny.

Yglesias gamely tries to give American policy-makers of the 'twenties a bit of a break, arguing that they should not be blamed for failing to predict the massive - and preventable - worldwide depression that sent the Weimar Republic spinning into oblivion and generally undermined the post-Versailles international order:

...if you look at the history of Germany, the Nazis were not an especially large, powerful, or influential political movement. Indeed, as of 1928-29, the troubled Weimar Republic looked to have substantially stabilized itself. It seems very plausible to imagine that a normal economic downturn, rather than a years-long total collapse, would have prevented the Nazis from ever coming to power.

And had that happened, is it really so implausible to think that the US foreign policymakers of the 1920s would have looked pretty vindicated? Not that all wars would have been avoided, of course, but that the era of great power wars would have ended in 1918 rather than 1945, not because of a difference in foreign policy but because of a difference in macroeconomic management? Was it really so naive of Secretary Kellogg to have not foreseen an unprecedented economic collapse years in the future leading to the rise of an unprecedented political movement?

It's a fair point, and I'm not usually one to get down on idealist international thinkers. We all make mistakes after all and, given the choice, making them in the cause of world peace isn't such a bad thing. Still, I think Yglesias misreads the ultimate causes of the systemic breakdowns that led to the Second World War, and in so doing misidentifies the problems with the types of international norms and institutions that people like Kellogg and the boosters for the League of Nations were trying to build.

I would argue that, while the Great Depression certainly made it more likely that excessively dangerous and aggressive political regimes would establish themselves in various corners of the globe, there were far greater systemic problems with the post-Versailles world that nobody was really trying to address. The Versailles Treaty, for example, didn't even try to restore the status quo ante bellum in the tradition of its Vienna predecessor, but instead tried to restore something like the status quo ante ante bellum, or that time in the mid-nineteenth century when Britain and France were riding high on their ever-expanding empires and a united Germany had not yet coalesced to pose an economic and political threat to the established order. In other words, it tried to establish a balance of power via legal fiat that didn't correspond with the balance as it actually existed.

Ditto with some of the arms control treaties of the period, all of which sought to contain an (naval, especially) arms race, but all of which were quickly circumvented or ignored by the applicable powers, the United States included. It wasn't that they were bad ideas as such, but that they sought to legally establish Britain and the United States as the world's preeminent naval powers, limiting naval growth of emerging countries like Japan. Had they been observed as intended, they would have done a great job protecting British and American interests in East Asia, much to Japan's detriment. Obviously, Japan had every reason to chafe under treaties that codified its status as an inferior power. Japanese representatives notably didn't even show up to the last of the conferences.

The final and most important thing to remember about the inter-war world, though, was that most of it was still formally run by a small group of imperial centers. Natural shifts in the balance of power that, in a world characterized by more fluid imperial arrangements, might have been gradually negotiable without major wars were instead constrained by the formal apparatuses of colonialism. Under such circumstances, war was the only route by which the makeup and balance of the international order could change. It was a really, really combustible arrangement.

There is, I swear, a point to this trip down memory lane. It's that the failure of inter-war foreign policy is due to more than an excess in idealism, and that its legacy probably wouldn't have been saved absent the catastrophe of the Great Depression (I'm thoroughly unconvinced by Yglesias's statement that, with different macroeconomic management, "the era of great power wars would have ended in 1918 rather than 1945"). Rather, the most serious failure of the norm-and-institution-builders between the Wars was the failure to match what they were trying to build with the systemic circumstances in which they found themselves. Rather than ask countries to abrogate violence, they needed to find a way for shifts in the balance of power to occur without it. Rather than try to build norms against territorial conquest, they needed to create an economic environment in which economies could gain access to resources and labor outside their borders via peaceful means (like free trade). Obviously, this would have been a tall order, as it would have involved the whosale reform of the British, French, Japanese and American empires, but at least it would have coherently aligned collective objectives with parochial interests.

This is all worth remembering as we consider the major international institutions of our own day. Some, like the IMF, WTO and European Union have been reasonably successful in improving international governance (though all are in need of reform), and it is notable that most of them appeal to national interest and make room for shifting power arrangements. Others, like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the UN Security Council, which attempt to calcify yesteryear's balance of power, find their effectiveness and relevance fraying. If we're serious about repairing and redirecting such institutions, we'd do well to bear in mind the mistakes of our predecessors.

Ruminations on Iran, History, and Imaging the State

Again, I don't have much informed to add to what's going on in Iran, other than to say that if the opposition can turn at least some of the security forces* to their side (the regular army perhaps), they've got a shot of making real changes. If they can't, I doubt much change will immediately come out of the past week's events. That's not exactly a mind-blowing statement; it's been true of every revolution since France in 1789, but still.

I did want to direct readers to Greenwald's piece pointing out the hypocrisy of those in the United States who've spent so much time encouraging the U.S. to bomb Iran who are now expressing such concern for the plight of "the Iranian people," as though U.S. ordinance would simply have blown up abstract threats from which Iran's "people" can be separated. Money quote:

Imagine how many of the people protesting this week would be dead if any of these bombing advocates had their way -- just as those who paraded around (and still parade around) under the banner of Liberating the Iraqi People caused the deaths of hundreds of thousands of them, at least. Hopefully, one of the principal benefits of the turmoil in Iran is that it humanizes whoever the latest Enemy is. Advocating a so-called "attack on Iran" or "bombing Iran" in fact means slaughtering huge numbers of the very same people who are on the streets of Tehran inspiring so many -- obliterating their homes and workplaces, destroying their communities, shattering the infrastructure of their society and their lives. The same is true every time we start mulling the prospect of attacking and bombing another country as though it's some abstract decision in a video game.

Amen.

In addition to the rightly deserved rebuke to the bomb-first-ask-questions-later crowd, though, I think Greenwald's piece, and the events in Iran in general, should remind us all to be very careful about how we think of "states," "countries," "societies," "nations," "governments," and "people." Very often, people who write on international issues (myself very much included), talk about "Iran" or "North Korea" taking some action or having some action taken upon them. In discussions about military options related to Iran's nuclear program, for example, statements like "bomb Iran," "bomb the Iranians," and "attack Iran's nuclear program" are used almost interchangeably. At times I think this is no more than writers bowing to the exigencies of time, space, convenient shorthand or literary elegance, but it contributes to everyone involved anthropomorphizing states in a way that makes clear thinking about geopolitical action difficult.

"Iran" is generally considered to be an adversary of the U.S. Does that mean that the Iranian government is an adversary? The Iranian people? Those segments of Iranian society that support the Iranian government? The ideology that underpins Islamic governance in Iranian society? "Iran" writ large as a cultural and political entity? These may seem like petty semantic questions, but it really matters that policymakers have a good idea of what precisely it is about "Iran" that is so problematic, what they would like to see "Iran" become, and how they envision the one "Iran" transforming into the other.

In my admittedly brief forays into political science and policy literature, I've noticed how stuck most thinkers are with an image of the state whose foundations rest on the "black box" or "billiard ball" concept of international relations. "The State" is conceived as an independent actor, interacting with other states, while its internal machinations are considered primarily in relation to it. In other words, even those of us who nominally reject such thinking still frame our rejection in relation to the existence of a model that treats the state as a unitary being.

I don't think this is just a product of IR theory, but of how we learn about our world. Think about how an average historically-informed person would talk about the political history of the past century. It might go something like: In 1914 there was a world war between Germany, Austria, the Ottoman Empire, Italy, England, France, Russia and the United States. Then during the inter-war period, Russia, Germany, Austria, Italy and Japan underwent revolutions, the world underwent massive economic turmoil, then, in 1939 Germany invaded Poland, and another World War began between Germany, Italy, France, England, Russia (now the U.S.S.R.), and the United States. Once Germany and Japan lost, the United States and the U.S.S.R. attained superpower status and competed for power in Europe and the newly-forming states emerging out of the old European empires. I could go on, and obviously I'm leaving things out, but that's beside the point. The point is that we learn history, at least in the modern era, as a story in which states are the principle characters. We are also taught about people, movements, ideas, ethics, technology, geography etc., but this information fills in a narrative whose basic structure is state-centric.

It's no wonder, then, that when people talk about international politics, even when they're trying to make points about public perception, or technology, or economics, they do so in state-based shorthand. It's the language that both they and their listeners know best how to speak. I would argue that this shorthand, always present but never defined, is one of the things that allows pundits to separate "the Iranian people" from the more amorphous entity of "Iran" when it comes to advocating major military action. The very imprecision with which so many of us discuss concepts like "Iran" allows us to pick and choose which elements - the government, the people, the ideology - we want our policy to target without really considering that policy's broader effects. If we don't have a clear picture of how the whole of a society functions, we end up making sense of it by picking and choosing those elements that best fit our own desires and preconceptions. Thus "America" can attack "Iran" without contradicting U.S. leaders' professed respect for the people who are now risking their lives in its streets.

The limitations of our own minds can be dangerous.

*Hat tip to Andrew Sullivan.

Events in Iran Might Force Obama to Change Middle East Plans

Don’t miss this excellent analysis by the BBC’s Jim Muir of the political situation in Iran (with notes on the growing protest’s implications on all key players).

Muir also makes an interesting point on the way the unexpected developments surrounding the elections have damaged President’s Obama’s plans to engage in a dialogue with the regime in Tehran.

For Mr Obama to have opened dialogue with Tehran under a credibly-re-elected Mr. Ahmadinejad would have been difficult enough in US domestic political terms.
But American experts on US-Iran relations believe his task will be considerably complicated in Congress and elsewhere should the election be seen as rigged and the results imposed by repression.

The outcome has also played into the hands of Benjamin Netanyahu's hardline government in Israel.

Under pressure to come up with what it regards as concessions on the Palestinian issue, Mr Netanyahu has tried to argue that priority should go to what he sees as the true threat to the region - Iran.

If the Iranian election crisis is not somehow defused, he will clearly find it easier to argue his case that "the biggest threat to Israel, the Middle East and the entire world is the crossing of a nuclear weapon with radical Islam" and that there should be "an international coalition against the nuclear arming of Iran", as he said in his policy speech on Sunday.

Info on Events in Iran

I don't have much informed to say at the moment on the events taking place in Iran, except to note that, even from this far away vantage point, watching all this unfold through deeply tinted and out-of-focus glasses, it really appears as though something extraordinary might be happening. That aside, below are a few sources that seem to be carrying good regular updates (all pretty high-profile already, but worth directing to):

• Andrew Sullivan, who's basically devoting his whole page to Iranian news at the moment.
• Enduring America, not exclusive, but some good stuff.
• Juan Cole, not minute-by-minute, but always an interesting perspective.
• niacINsight, from the Iranian-American community.
  
• persiankiwi (Twitter, which I usually can't stand but for which I'm gaining new respect, from someone on the ground).
• mousavi1388 (ditto).
  

Netanyahu accepts a Palestinian state (has some tiny conditions, though)

You can say that Benjamin Netanyahu raised impossible demands from the Palestinians this evening in his "major diplomatic speech," as he called it (full text here). You can say that he didn't accept the American demand for a complete stop of all construction projects in the West bank and East Jerusalem. You can say that he spent most of his time repeating his usual narrative of peace-seeking Israelis and Arab Rejectionism, and that he was "boldly stepping into 1993". And you would probably be right in saying all this.

But what I heard today was the last Israeli leader to accept the idea of a Palestinian state.

There is no national figure to the right of Netanyahu, only second rate extremists. Avigdor Liberman long ago accepted the idea of a Palestinian state. So did, in less than a decade, Ariel Sharon, Ehud Olmert and Tzipi Livni – all of them formerly Likud people, even hard-liners, who finally understood that from an Israeli point of view, even a Zionist one, there is no real alternative. Twenty years ago, even Labor leaders didn't speak of a Palestinian state. It was considered a radical-leftist idea. Things changed; one can't deny that - but at what price!

So much for historical perspective. Now we can take apart some of the smaller details of the speech:

● Negotiations: Netanyahu called for immediate negotiations with all Arab leaders, "without preconditions." This in something Israeli leaders always said, and the Arabs will probably reject this idea again. The reason is simple: The only asset the Arab leaders are holding is the possibility of legitimizing Israel, and negotiations can be seen as a form of legitimation. That's why most leaders will ask for something in return before engaging in direct talks – if not from Israel, than from the US.

● A Jewish State: Netanyahu wasn't completely honest when he claimed to be ready to negotiate without preconditions. He had some conditions, especially for the Palestinian side. First, he asked Palestinians to recognize Israel as a Jewish state (in fact, if I got it right, he kind of asked the whole Arab world to do so). This is something the Palestinians will never do, because they would be betraying the cause of Palestinians citizens of Israel – which make up 20 percent of the population – for equal political and civil rights. But Netanyahu knows that this demand sounds good to the Israeli public, as well as to American Jews (unlike his insistence on building settlements), so he keeps on raising the issue, assuming it can help him out of tough corners in the future.

● Hamas: Netanyahu had another condition for the Palestinians. He demanded the PA does something the Israeli Army couldn't do: remove Hamas from power and re-seize control over the Gaza strip. Again, Netanyahu probably knows that moderate Arab leaders, with the silent support of the Obama administration, are moving in the opposite direction, of establishing a Palestinian unity government that will be able to negotiate with Israel. The Hamas problem allows him to buy time.

In my view, this is currently the biggest obstacle in the way of the peace process. This is not about declaring something about a Jewish homeland, like the previous demand. We can always work out a fancy statement that will keep almost everyone happy. This is a real political mess: Hamas controls Gaza. The PLO controls the West Bank. Are we to establish three states? The position Netanyahu took actually gives veto power over any agreement to Hamas – and the PM might be counting on them to use it.

● Settlements: Thirty words. That's what Netanyahu had to say about the issue which stood at the bottom of his confrontation with Obama, as well as his political problems at home. Bottom line: the PM presented the consensus he was able to build in his government as a response to the American demand. No new settlements will be built, and there will be no further confiscation of Palestinian land (I won't go into the legal details, but this doesn't mean much, because Israel decided long ago most of the land in the WB is "public land", and therefore open for construction). We will have to see what Israel really does on the ground - and how the Administration responds - in order to judge both sides' commitment to their positions.

● Borders, Security, Refugees and Jerusalem: we had nothing new here. A typical Israeli hard-line. Netanyahu even said at one point that "my positions on these matters are well known." And that's exactly how we should look at them – his positions, which will be subject to whatever happens at the negotiating table.

● And that's my bottom line: I never thought – and I still don't think – that Benjamin Netanyahu is the right man to lead Israel out of the West Bank (not to mention bring peace for the region). Not because he is a radical - Sharon was considered much worse before he took power - but because he hasn't got the right character, nor the right ambitions. But he can still play a big role in this process, and if he does, this day will be remembered as his first step. It took Obama only two months to get him there. We should be optimistic.

Ahmadinejad Wins

Events are still rolling in Iran, but Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was declared winner in the presidential elections, and there are no indications that the demonstrations of Mir Hossein Mousavi's supporters can change that. Not with the supreme leader Ali Khemenei and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps on the president's side.

Here are some of my initial thoughts on the matter.

● Some people might see the election's outcome as a blow for president Obama. This is true only to a certain extent. I don’t believe the American president was thinking that his speech in Cairo – inspiring as it was – will result in immediate political changes in the region. Things just don't work this way, so we shouldn't credit Obama for the success of the pro-western coalition in Lebanon, nor for the reformists' failure in Iran.

On the other hand, marketing some sort of agreement with Iran to the American and Israeli public – like the idea that Iran will become a threshold state, meaning one that has the nuclear technology and potential but not an actual bomb – would have been much easier if Mousavi was in power, and not Holocaust-denying-Ahmadinejad, with whom every deal will be labeled as a new Munich Agreement. But even here there is a positive angle: forming a moderate camp in the Middle East which will stand together against Iran's influence – the thing Obama is trying to do - might be easier now, since the current Iranian president makes everyone in the region nervous, not just the Israelis.

● The demonstrations following the elections were the most notable outburst of the conflict between reformist and hardliners - which dominates Iranian politics - since the students' protest in 1999. This is something we tend to miss. The other side is never a monolith, and sometimes internal political circumstances affect a country's international behavior just as what we perceive as its long term strategic ambitions or interests. It is clear that the tension with the West played into the hands of Ahmadinejad, who claimed to have made Iran the region's superpower and the center of the world's attention. If some sort of pressure is to be applied on Iran as part of the effort to stop its nuclear program, its effects on the internal dynamics should be considered as well.

● The probability of an Israeli attack on the Iranian nuclear facilities remains very low. A week prior to the presidential elections, Israel's Foreign minister, Avigdor Liberman, completely ruled out the possibility of an Israeli air strike. And Liberman is not known for his tendency to put out fires. It is said that Benjamin Netanyahu will dedicate a long section in his much awaited speech tomorrow to Iran, and I think he will try to send out the message that Israel is keeping all its options open, including the military one.

● Many people in the Middle East are looking east now – to see how the new American Administration – as well as the international community – deals with North Korea. If the effort to contain the threats posed by Pyongyang will be perceived as a failure, the Administration will have a much weaker hand when it tries to deal with Tehran – or with Jerusalem, for that matter.

● And Finally, upon entering his second term, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad should send a bouquet of flower to one George W. Bush in Texas, for ridding Iran of its archenemy, thus ending their historic balance of power, allowing Teheran to set itself new ambitious goals in the region, and start an unconventional weapon race - something that the previous regime in Baghdad would have never allowed.

Bibi Changes Tack?

I'm eagerly awaiting what I'm sure will be a better-informed take on this news from Noam, but reports indicate that Netanyahu is preparing to make a speech accepting the principle of a Palestinian state. I think the Yglesias take on this is worth a look, as is that of Ackerman. It looks like the conditions under which Netanyahu would accept a Palestinian state are pretty onerous - no meaningful military, no treaties with states hostile to Israel (however one defines that), no control over air space, no control over radio spectrum etc. - but it's a step forward in its way. Just shows to go 'ya what can happen when a U.S. administration gets real about pursuing a meaningful peace deal.

My worry is that Netanyahu's strategy here is to make a symbolic, though important, concession in order to get the U.S. to take the pressure off on the settlement issue. Bibi may hope he can trade a rhetorical concession for a substantive one. The fact remains unchanged that Netanyahu's governing coalition probably wouldn't survive the kinds of concessions that would be necessary to make a lasting deal with the Palestinians, so I'm worried that Netanyahu is playing for time rather than really trying to square that circle.

Still, as Yglesias points out, "a cynical and nominal embrace of a two-state solution still means that there’s no longer any meaningful Israeli political space to the right of the common sense and appropriate view that the only way for Israel to enjoy long-term security is by peacefully coexisting with an independent Palestine." That's no small thing, and with any luck it's a condition that will persist in Israel long after Netanyahu's second political obituaries are written.

What's a Little Coup Here and There?

Charles Krauthammer's latest fit of frustration over Barack Obama's recent speech anti-American screed makes for mildly amusing reading, particularly since he manages to get through a whole column without really saying anything, but there's one bit that deserves a little unpacking:

...He told Iran that, on the one hand, America once helped overthrow an Iranian government, while on the other hand "Iran has played a role in acts of hostage-taking and violence against U.S. troops and civilians." (Played a role?!) We have both sinned; let us bury the past and begin anew.

...

...Of course there are rights and wrongs in all human affairs. Our species is a fallen one. But that doesn't mean that these rights and wrongs are of equal weight.

A CIA rent-a-mob in a coup 56 years ago does not balance the hostage-takings, throat-slittings, terror bombings and wanton slaughters perpetrated for 30 years by a thug regime in Tehran (and its surrogates) that our own State Department calls the world's "most active state sponsor of terrorism."

To start with, I think getting into nitpicky debates over which state or regime is evil-er is a pretty pointless exercise. Just to be clear, I think that the current Iranian regime is highly undesirable, as it is based on a theory of government that is fundamentally incompatible with human rights, and has a consistent record of repression, violence and terrorism both within and without the borders of Persia. It is absurd, in my mind, to present the governments in Washington and Tehran as morally equivalent, and that's not what Obama was doing in his speech. Diplomacy, though, sometimes requires emphasizing shared connections and responsibilities rather than hurling insults. It's what statesmen do.

More to the point, though, is Krauthammer's blithe dismissal of the seriousness of U.S. actions in Mossadegh's overthrow in 1953. So the CIA threw a little money around to create artificial rioting and foment a military coup. So what? We did that all the time, right? It's what great powers do. You can't tell me the Iranians are still pissed off about it?

To most Americans, even those who know something of our history during the Cold War, CIA-sponsored coups were indeed a dime a dozen. The world was a chessboard, and that's how the game was played. For the countries that found themselves in the position of chess pieces, though, it bears remembering that the damage we did to their political psyche ran very, very deep. Mossadegh's overthrow wasn't just about Mossadegh. It was about strangling the democratic future of a state fighting to emerge from the shadows of the Russian and British Empires. The Shah who took over Iran was a brutal, repressive dictator whose regime relied on oil rents and brute force to stay in control. Evin prison, where Roxanna Saberi was just held, was built by his security services, and used to much the same purpose that it is under the current government.

I don't say this to justify the crimes of the Islamic Republic. Krauthammer is right to eschew such simplistic equivalencies (though, again, he's attacking a straw man). I say this to emphasize that there are plenty of people in Iran today who remember the repression of the Shah, who remember relatives killed and tortured by his regime, and remember that it was the United States that helped put him in power. That's not a minor thing, even a half-century later. That's the kind of thing that leaves real, lasting pain.

My hope is that both Iran and the United States can reach to some kind of accomodation in the coming years. That will involve letting a lot of bad blood and a lot of bad history roll off everyone's collective shoulders. That won't happen, though, if our government takes Krauthammer's view, that political engineering through secrecy and violence is no big deal, just business.

Uighurs to Bermuda, BBC Nonplussed

The British have a unique capability, lost on us Yanks, to speak in the most unfailingly gracious and polite manner while letting the listener know, through some mystical combination of inflection and word choice, that they're really quite upset. I realized this morning that this quality extends to the printed word. Exhibit A is this article from the BBC about the U.S. settling some of the Uighurs at Guantanamo in Bermuda. The problem, it seems, is that America didn't notify London of this decision:

But perhaps the new administration has not yet caught up on the niceties of what powers the mother country retains over these "overseas territories". It is security, defence and foreign policy, if they ever ask.

The piece maintains all the niceties of journalistic analysis, with a bit of cheekiness thrown in to take the edge off, but I can't help noticing a rather irritated undercurrent on the part of the author. Polite façade aside, I imagine what he really meant was, "excuse me, I don't mean to be a boor, but could you please manhandle your own colonies and leave ours alone?"

Putin Signals Openness to the Logic of Zero

Le Monde reports (French) that Vladimir Putin* has declared Russia would be ready to renounce nuclear arms if the United States will do the same. Obviously, it's a very hypothetical statement, and something that any leader can say with very little political cost (who wouldn't, in theory, want a world without nuclear weapons?), but I still think it's telling that he's willing to make such pronouncements in public, at a time when the U.S. is signaling new openness to the idea of further arms reductions. Not a sea change by any means, but it certainly improves the diplomatic atmosphere.

*Amusing aside: As someone who lived in Montreal for a time, I find it a little hilarious that the French spelling of his name is "Poutine." Those who have spent any time in Quebec will know why.

Update: I swear I wasn't trying to be a pretentious ass by linking to a French article, it's just the first place I ran across the news. Here's an English version from the BBC.

The Return of Shoe-Politics

What do you see in this picture?

(a) President Barack Obama deliberately pointing his shoes to the camera during his phone conversation with Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu, in order to humiliate Netanyahu (In the Arab world, pointing shoes at someone is a great insult. That goes for throwing shoes as well).

(b) President Barack Obama relaxed while talking to Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu, thus showing there is no real tension between the two states.

Both options were considered carefully for the last 48 hours, as this official photo, released through the WH photostream on flickr.com, became the center of a heated debate in the Israeli media, one which overshadowed the content of the actual conversation between the Netanyahu and Obama. Several TV pundits found the picture "offensive;" it was the most commented item on nrg.co.il news site for a whole day, and the channel two site even posted an article by a body language expert who analyzed the president's position in detail (She pointed to Obama's hand gesture and deduced the President was relaxed though "in control," and certainly not offensive). No doubt, Shoe-politics had its best year since Nikita Khrushchev banged his shoe on the delegate desk of the UN.

It came to the point where even a reasonable journalist like Haaretz's diplomatic correspondent, Aluf Ban, wrote that:

A photo released by the White House, which shows Obama talking on the phone with Netanyahu on Monday, speaks volumes: The president is seen with his legs up on the table, his face stern and his fist clenched, as though he were dictating to Netanyahu: "Listen up and write 'Palestinian state' a hundred times. That's right, Palestine, with a P." As an enthusiast of Muslim culture, Obama surely knows there is no greater insult in the Middle East than pointing the soles of one's shoes at another person. Indeed, photos of other presidential phone calls depict Obama leaning on his desk, with his feet on the floor.

This is taking it a bit too far, I think. There is however a serious lesson here: In other times, this whole debate would have never happened, but the anxiety and tension are so high these days, that a minor detail like this can suddenly become the center of national attention. For Israelis, It's all about Obama now. The public fails to see the delicate game of interests the new administration is trying to play, and is focused only on what seems to be a cold shoulder from Israel's greatest ally.

At the moment, this is not very important, but when the peace process does get under way, the administration will need to find a way to show empathy and win support from the public on the Israeli side as well, if it wants to keep things moving. This was done in the past. Not long ago, there was a man who pushed Israel to great concessions and was still more popular than any local politician. His name was Bill Clinton. One wonders if the new secretary of state might even consider hiring him as a special envoy to the region one day.

Misreading the Balance of Power

Friend of FPW Eric Martin over at American Footprints notes that an Israeli government minister, Yossi Peled, proposed putting sanctions on the United States in response to Barack Obama's indicated intention to change American priorities in the Middle East.

Martin brings up a number of reasons why this would be a comically stupid thing for Israel to do, and I doubt the proposal will go anywhere, but it's worth noting the incongruities of the strategy that Peled proposes:

...the minister suggests reconsidering military and civilian purchases from the US, selling sensitive equipment that the Washington opposes distributing internationally, and allowing other countries that compete with the US to get involved with the peace process and be given a foothold for their military forces and intelligence agencies.

Peled said that shifting military acquisition to America's competition would make Israel less dependent on the US. For instance, he suggested buying planes from the France-based Airbus firm instead of the American Boeing.

In what may be his most controversial suggestion, Peled recommends intervening in American congressional races to weaken Obama and asking American Jewish donors not to contribute to Democratic congressional candidates. He predicted that this would result in Democratic candidates pressuring Obama to become more pro-Israel.

Now, I'll be the first person to admit that the U.S. military sells/donates a lot of hardware to Israel, and that the Pentagon's relationship with the Israelis is important, but does Peled think that telling the U.S. military where to stick it is going to make "pro-Israel" congresspeople more likely to push back against Obama? If Israel were to "sanction" the United States (I can't even write that down without being slightly bemused), it would make it more difficult, not less, to get support on the Hill, because Congressional Democrats who might otherwise be inclined to ask the President to back off would be facing constituencies annoyed with Tel Aviv.

Carrot-and-stick works (maybe) when you're the more powerful country in the relationship. When you're lower on the pecking order, it's generally a good idea to pick one or the other.