Obama's War

This piece is the first in a series of posts that I'll be writing over the coming weeks that look at our developing policy towards Afghanistan in a historical context, drawing from our involvement in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s.

You have to wonder about the extent to which Obama's developing strategy in Afghanistan is based not upon a comprehensive foreign policy plan, but on pure domestic political calculations. More bluntly, and at the risk of sounding sensationalist, are we considering an escalation in our involvement in Afghanistan in order to pass a health care bill or ensure Obama's re-election?

It's not entirely out of the question. Obama has, for better or worse, staked out this conflict as "his war." He has taken personal ownership of it. It's not the Afghans' war; it's Obama's. By tacitly admitting defeat, by acknowledging that the war is unwinnable, by pulling American troops out of Afghanistan, Obama would make himself the target of a barrage of criticism from Congress and from the media; he would be labeled a weak, ineffective, and even cowardly leader. Without a doubt, such accusations would severely undercut Obama's impressive domestic agenda, including his health care package, his immigration proposals, and his plan for heavy investment in infrastructure. Can a president, weakened by a debilitating foreign policy defeat, truly implement his domestic goals? In most cases, history shows us, the answer is a clear no.

So you have to wonder: Is Obama recommitting to this war because he truly believes we can win (despite the obvious signs that victory is nowhere in sight), or is he hedging his bets and agreeing to some modest troop increases in order to, in part, save his ambitious domestic agenda?

Lyndon Johnson, in the mid-1960s, faced this same dilemma. Remember, LBJ hated the Vietnam War. He hated the Cabinet meetings, the casualty reports, the protests from anti-war demonstrators, the public criticism, the body bags. In fact, Johnson was not much of a foreign policy practitioner; he had little eye for foreign affairs, as biographies about him indicate, and he had a poor understanding for history or cultural differences. It was domestic policy that he excelled at. But I would argue that while it is true that LBJ fundamentally worried about the effect that war might have in serving as a distraction from his Great Society agenda, he also realized that he had to look strong and appease certain constituencies in order to pass his desired legislation. In essence, crass though it may sound, it may be fair to say that Johnson traded American and Vietnamese lives overseas for Medicare and the Great Society at home.

Johnson believed, at least early in his presidency, that if he pulled out of Vietnam, he'd face a popular revolt from not only Republicans but also members of his own party, particularly hawkish southern Democrats. Attacked as a coward and a poor president, he would have little remaining political capital to push through civil rights legislation or any of the rest of his sweeping legislative plan. Is Obama engaged in a similar calculation? Like Johnson, is he preparing to sacrifice additional American lives in order to, in part, safeguard and bolster an ambitious domestic agenda? It is a question worth considering.


Photo credit: (Doug Mills/The New York Times/Redux)