In the Red Corner, at 6-foot-4-inches...

Writing at the WaPo's PostPartisan, columnist David Ignatius says it all:

I’ve watched other “dream team” cabinets fall into disarray because of the conflict between strong personalities, and this problem has been most acute when there’s a weak national security adviser. That happened during the Reagan administration, when George Shultz was at State, Casper Weinberger was at Defense and a dazed Robert McFarlane was trying to keep order through the NSC. It was a mess.

I remember, too, the enthusiasm that initially greeted President George W. Bush’s all-star team -- the veterans Colin Powell at State, Don Rumsfeld at the Pentagon and, as a special bonus, Dick Cheney as vice president. They were certified foreign-policy superstars and, what’s more, they had all worked together before. To say that they made a mess does not do justice to its toxicity. The problems were compounded by Condoleezza Rice’s weakness as national security adviser, and by her inability to help the president maintain order in this, forgive the term, “team of rivals.”

I think that last point is spot on. If ever there were a "team of rivals," in the truest sense of the phrase, the Powell-Cheney-Rumsfeld-Rice shop that was so awkwardly grouped together in Bush's first term was it. There was no balance between the competing egos and agendas; differences that should have been hammered out and morphed into a policy all sides were on board with were instead transformed into personal vendettas. Instead of the typical inter-agency policy process that ensures that the US government speaks with one voice, officials went behind each other's back directly to the president and cut others out of the loop. The result was one disaster after another, often with a stunning lack of correction. "Stay the course" might sound familiar here. Rice was too ineffective to cobble the squabbling players together after the first big internal battles were won.

I don't think it could seriously do any worse, but I'm hoping the incoming Obama team has learned all of the right lessons from those years. I think a point Ignatius spells out deserves to be digested by General Jim Jones, who is going to take over as director of the National Security Council, and instituted: take charge of your role. A sense of common purpose by itself is not enough for a strong, effective administration when it comes to national security. It's best augmented by a well-respected managerial head that is able to forge consensus where consensus might first not exist, who at the same time is able to maintain the confidence of those around him/her to be able to do so when it counts the most. In effect, a unifying figure vested with this refereeing authority by the other major players in the Cabinet. (Having a president willing to step in and reinforce this relationship when things go awry never hurts.)

Take a look at the picture above of the incoming national security adviser and ask yourself: no matter your ego and resumé, would you really want to cross him?