War Powers

Le guerre cominciano dove si decide, ma non finiscono dove si vorrebbe.

-Niccolo Machiavelli

James Baker III and Warren Christopher published an interesting piece in yesterday's Times calling for a reform of (well, actually a replacement of) the 1973 War Powers Resolution. They argue that this legislation, whatever its intentions, is constitutionally dubious, has been ignored by every administration since its passage, and doesn't fulfill its original aim of providing Congress with a meaningful voice in deciding when, where and how the United States goes to war. Baker and Christopher propose that Congress pass an alternative bill (their full report, including an outline of their proposed War Powers Consultation Act of 2009 is available here) that deliniates in very specific terms exactly how much power and consultative authority Congress ought to have on issues of war and peace.

I would suggest that readers review the report itself (or at least the executive summary), as it is an important document. The authors' proposed bill strengthens Congress's consultative powers, providing for the establishment of a "Joint Congressional Consultation Committee" from which the President is required to seek counsel in advance of (or shortly after) the initiation of a "significant armed conflict." It also slightly weakens Congress's presumptive perrogative of affirmatively approving armed conflict, as the lack of a Congressional resolution approving of a given military deployment is not taken ipso facto as a rejection of it, as is the case under the 1973 law. On the other hand, the proposed statute provides specific guidelines that should guarantee some type of up-or-down vote on a conflict shortly after its initiation.

Overall, I think that the report's recommendations are sensible, and I hope that the next Congress and Administration act on them. Baker and Christopher seem to have gone out of their way to ensure that members of Congress play an active consultative role in setting U.S. security policy, without so thoroughly tying the hands of the executive as to make such policy too cumbersome to implement. I am particularly enthusiastic about their granting the Consultation Committee its own staff and access to intelligence data. We are now living through the unfortunate consequences of having a Congress that is over-reliant on the executive branch for its information.

For anyone who thinks, though, that the implementation of this law, or indeed any law enumerating what war powers fall to what branch of government, will decrease the likelihood of the United States being drawn into foolish, hubristic, destructive and unnecessary conflicts, let me disabuse them of that notion right now. The problem of American blood and treasure being consumed by conflicts that do not merit their commitment has little to do with the separation of powers. Indeed it has little to do with procedural issues of any kind. It arises, rather, from the nature of war and republican government.

Machiavelli famously wrote that "wars begin where you will, but they do not end where you please." For his Prince, such warnings were important for the sake of remaining in power. For leaders - and citizens - of a republic, they carry more significant meaning. One needn't hold a degree from West Point to understand that the lack of a unified chain of command in wartime can be disastrous. The founding fathers understood this when they made the President the Commander in Chief of the armed forces. Soldiers should have no doubt about where the ultimate authority behind their orders lies; if they do, the army ceases to function with necessary unity and discipline. But that imperative for a unified chain of command is inimical to the spirit of republican government, with its slow debate, multiple power centers and messy compromises. When it comes to a budget resolution, a health care bill or a highway package, the legislature's power of the purse gives it as much power as the executive. When it comes to war and peace, the ability of a president to order soldiers into battle and make congressional support all but a foregone conclusion is assured simply by the nature of military hierarchy and the unique ability of the White House to shape the contours of public debate.

It is telling that in the past century, the United States has not engaged in a significant, prolonged military conflict without initial Congressional support, and that even when such support has waned with time, Congress was able to do little to shape military policy. Legislative instruments for controlling the prosecution of wars are few - limited mainly to the power of the purse and the power of impeachment - and absent constitutional reform making the Senate majority leader the Commander in Chief, they are likely to stay that way. Once troops are in harms way, the political consequences of denying them funds are such that legislators seldom do it. At most, Congress can tinker around a war's edges, and occaisionally give it inglorious punctuation if its failure becomes manifest. As to granting Congress a more robust consultative role, such a role would only be effective with a president that is willing to accept counsel in good faith. The last seven years have demonstrated that such a leader, tragically, cannot be counted upon.

This leaves, then, the hope that Congress will play a more active and critical role before wars begin. Again, though, I do not believe that a more engaged Congress will necessarily yield better results. Members of Congress are, by the nature of their position, highly sensitive to public opinion, without the pulpit to shape such opinion that is afforded to the executive branch. Thomas Ricks' Fiasco documents in scathing detail the failure of members of Congress to check the designs of the Bush administration in the months leading up to the Iraq War. I must say, though, that I came away from his account sympathetic to their position. So many felt pressured by their constituents and their opponents to support a resolution for war, and in a way, that's how a democracy is supposed to work.

Congress, in the end, will be no better a judge of the wisdom of going to war than the people who elect it. The body that will be the best check against an overreaching executive will never be Congress, whatever legislative reforms it may pass. Ultimately, the responsibility for judging the prudence of major military action lies with the media, and with American civil society at large. It is our job as citizens to pick apart the case made for war, deconstructing its logic, prodding its flaws, and ensuring that no wiser course of action exists. If we continue to abdicate that responsibility to our Congress and our president - whoever may fill those roles - then we will no doubt continue to suffer for our indolence.