Interview: Bernard Finel

Bernard I. Finel, PhD has served as an Associate Professor at the National War College and has served as both faculty member at and executive director of the Security Studies Program and the Center for Peace and Security Studies at Georgetown University. He is co-editor and co-author of Power and Conflict in the Age of Transparency and Ultimate Security: Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction. Finel is currently a senior fellow at the American Security Project, where he has authored numerous reports on defense policy and counter-terrorism, the most recent of which is titled Are We Winning? Measuring Progress in the Struggle Against Violent Jihadism. He has been recently featured, among other places, at PostGlobal and on the Huffington Post. I was recently able to speak with Dr. Finel about his views on the state of violent jihadism worldwide, America's position in the Middle East, and where we go from here*:

In a recent article in the New Yorker, Lawrence Wright cited the "conversion" from advocating violence of Sayyid Imam al-Sharif (a.k.a. Dr.Fadl) as well as that of others as evidence of an internal rebellion within the jihadist ranks that has robbed al-Qaeda of much of its intellectual credibility and that may lead to an eventual tactical and ideological moderation of the movement. Do you give credence to his reporting, or is it wishful thinking?

The reporting is credible, the conclusions overdrawn. There has unquestionably been an upsurge in criticism of the jihadist movement from within its ranks, and in the case of “Dr. Fadl” from a prominent theorist of the movement. But I don’t see anything extraordinary about this development. The jihadist movement has never been monolithic. Rather it emerged out of a series of debates. In the first half of the 20th century, many Muslim intellectuals sought to explain the relative weakness of the Muslim world vis-à-vis the West. Some believed the problem was the failure to embrace secularism which led to the secularist ideology of Ataturk’s Turkey as well as the “Arab Socialism” of people like Nasser. When that failed, there were movements towards Pan Arabism as well as a resurgence of Islamist sentiment. Among the Islamists there was a debate over whether to follow a traditional version of Islam or some sort of updated one – similar to the divide between Orthodox and Reform Jews. Among the proponents of traditional Islam, there was a debate over whether they should seek to influence politics through peaceful or violent means. Among the violent Islamists there was debate over whether violence could be used solely against government targets, or whether terror against civilians might be legitimate. For those who promoted terrorism, there was a debate over whether to attack local governments (the “near enemy”) or those Western regimes that helped keep authoritarian elites in power (“the far enemy”). There have been debates over whether the Shiites could be considered allies or must be held at arm’s length. There have been debates about offering a truce to the West. There have been debates about how much effort must be made to avoid inflicting suffering on Muslims. All of these debates were driven, ultimately, by pragmatic and tactical concerns, though often legitimized through arcane religious justifications.

All of this is a long way to get to the core point. The new debates reflect a realization that the violent, indiscriminant use of violence has been at best ineffective, while at the same time it has inflicted a lot of suffering on Muslims. But we will only see moderation occur if a moderate alternative is proposed that actually addresses the problematic conditions in the Muslim world. Right now, some Muslim intellectuals are saying that bin Ladenism was a step in the wrong direction. By the radicals’ response, effectively, is, “okay, well then what do you propose we do to eliminate secular authoritarian elites and retake the offensive against Israel?” At this juncture, I just don’t see a strategic alternative in these arguments of the critics that will win the day. And what’s more, we have to remember that several of the most prominent “conversions” have occurred in jail, which is always suspect given the use of torture and other abuses in the region.

Ever since President Bush launched the "War on Terror," there has been a bit of a debate over both the practical and semantic identification of who exactly it is that the United States is fighting. In the report you recently co-wrote with Holly Crystal Gell, you use the phrase "violent jihadism." How would you go about isolating who and what that definition encompasses (that is, what people, and what ideas), and how ought that be presented in a clear way to American decision makers and the American public?

It is easy to get too wrapped up in the semantics. We are talking about al-Qaeda and similar groups that are willing and capable of using violence against the United States, our interests, and our allies. We thought the term “violent jihadists” best characterized this threat. In public discussions, I often refer to the “people who attacked us on 9/11” as a form of short-hand. The challenge is to explain that the violent jihadist movement is some sort of identifiable entity as differentiated from any Muslim group – whether state or non-state – who might wish us harm. Saddam Hussein was an enemy of the United States, but he was not a “violent jihadist” in my estimation. We have a lot of problems with Iran, but I would not put them into that category either. As a practical matter, I don’t really think there is that much ambiguity in this issue, and what ambiguity does exist is not a function of analytical confusion but rather of deliberate politicization.

There has been some debate in the foreign policy community about whether and how to engage "moderate" Islamist movements. In your view, are there Islamist groups with whom the United States can work (or which the United States can tolerate), and what are the criteria for separating those we can engage from those that are beyond the pale?

I think we should “engage” anyone and everyone. The key is not who you talk to; the key is keeping your goals and interests clearly in mind. Should we “engage” al-Qaeda? Sure, I’d “engage” them in talks about the mechanisms for them to dismantle their apparatus and turn over their leaders for prosecution. The issue of moderates is a rabbit hole of problems. It cannot possibly be in the U.S. interest to get involved in internal debates within the Muslim world. Our goals are pretty simple. We want security and stability, and we have certain commitments to human rights that we cannot turn a blind eye too. If you focus on interests, the issue resolves itself.

Clearly one of the basic tenets of the Bush Administration's foreign policy as it applies to the broader Middle East is the notion that democracy is a critical element in ultimately purging extremist movements from societies there. In your view, is democracy promotion something in which the United States ought to be actively engaged (and if so, in what way)? How high of a priority should it be with regard to combating extremist violence in both the short and long term?

I don’t think democracy can or should be imposed at the point of a gun. If we are required to engage in regime change because of the actions of our adversaries, then obviously we are going to have some obligation to try to establish a democratic system in its place. But in a place like Iraq, I think we met our obligations with that first set of elections. After that, it was up to the Iraqis to maintain democracy if they wanted it.

Beyond that, sure, all else equal the United States should seek to promote democracy. It is a good system, it helps protect human rights, and since it does give a voice to citizens it tends to mitigate the tendency to use violence by governmental critics.

More than anything else, though, we would gain more by keeping authoritarian regimes at arm’s length than we would be actively seeking to promote democratic change. In many ways, the democratic promotion agenda is an over-reaction. Before we worry about trying to spread democracy, we ought to first be limiting our ties to countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Our tight bonds with those countries make us complicit in their authoritarianism and makes us a lot of enemies in the Muslim world.

How important are particular leaders to the health of the jihadist movement? In attempting to undermine it in the long term, are we better off focusing resources on killing and capturing jihadist leadership, or are there broader social/political concerns that are more important?

It isn’t an either/or issue, because the resources used for each are quite different. We will never achieve success as long as the people who attacked us are alive and free and organizing against us. Every video and statement by bin Laden and Zawahiri is a reminder of our weakness and an encouragement of others to attack us. That said, killing or capturing the key figures will not end the challenge overnight, so we also need to thinking through our larger strategic goals. But the fact that they continue to elude us is a festering sore and we should not underestimate the impact this has recruitment and morale in the jihadist movement.

Much has been made of the importance of the Israeli-Palestinian (or Israeli-Arab) conflict to the perpetuation of violent jihadism worldwide. In your view, would some type of peace deal in the Levant be as much of a panacea as some have claimed? Is such a deal still realistically possible?

I don’t think it would solve much of anything. The roots of a jihadist movement are much deeper than Israel-Palestine, and in any case the jihadist movement has been adept at finding causes to mobilize supporters. In any case, short of a “deal” that involves the complete dismantling of Israel, the jihadists will remain angry. In the West, we tend to think that when people talk about ending the Israeli “occupation” they mean the West Bank and Gaza. But in reality, the “occupation” often refers to the occupation of Arab land by Jews, i.e. Israel proper. Anyway, I don’t think a deal is possible. Well, let me rephrase that. A “deal” is possible. Implementing a sustainable deal is not.

At the risk of reducing the discussion to the level of the absurd or the fantastic, were you to be sworn in as President tomorrow, what are the core changes that you would make in the way the United States approaches violent jihadism worldwide?

Wait, why is that absurd or fantastic? I am a naturally-born American citizen over the age of 35. I could be President.

Anyway, core changes. Our policy toward the jihadist threat ought to be two-fold. First, we have to punish those who attacked us in the past. It is simply intolerable that Osama bin Laden can continue to live freely. Even though this seems like a short-term thing, we actually need a long-term policy to deal with the problem. The challenge we face with capturing bin Laden – aside from the distraction of Iraq – is Pakistani sovereignty. Pakistan either cannot or will not track him down, and they won’t allow us to do it. That is, simply put, unacceptable. If Pakistan cannot control its territory, it should not be able to claim sovereignty over areas where it actually has no control. If it does have control, then it is essentially harboring terrorism. But this is not a matter of U.S.-Pakistani relations alone. The bigger issue is the rights and obligations of states to control their territory and the rights and obligations of states to defend themselves from threats that emanate from ungoverned spaces. There is, in short, a need for a new international legal framework that addresses terrorism, ungoverned spaces, and state sovereignty. Predator strikes and covert action are not a substitute for addressing this issue. So, first, we need to get bin Laden and others, and to do that we are going to need to sponsor some sort of new legal framework that will either prompt Pakistan to action or clear the way for us to do the job seriously.

Second, we need to understand why we were targeted in the first place. We, as a matter of deliberate policy, placed ourselves in the line of fire by (a) openly supporting authoritarian regimes that suppressed Islamist movements, and (b) allowing those regimes to export the threat by letting them blame us for their shortcomings. We did this because we believed that our interests in stability were paramount and that we were less vulnerable than our “allies” were. Consider Saudi Arabia. Our belief that Saudi Arabia is vulnerable to Islamist groups has made us back the monarchy despite its deliberate promotion of anti-American groups. To this day, plenty of money flows out of Saudi Arabia into the jihadist movement, school text books express the most venomous anti-American and anti-Semitic sentiments, and the Saudis deal much more harshly with critics of the monarchy than groups that express violent sentiments toward the United States. All of this has the result of channeling dissent toward anti-Americanism. Or consider the current situation in Iraq. Maliki needs us to stay in power, and yet in negotiations for a long-term American presence, he is portraying himself as resisting American demands. This ensures that our presence in Iraq will always been seen as externally imposed and thus resented. Why do we allow Maliki to do this? Because, we think he is vulnerable and needs political cover, and so we are willing to take the heat. Same with Pakistan and pressures to act against the jihadists in Waziristan. It is unpopular in Pakistan, and we are allowing them to make it seem as if their actions against the jihadists are being undertaken reluctantly due to American pressure. We play this game over and over throughout the Muslim world in an effort to ease the political pressure on our “allies.” And then, somehow, we are surprised when we get blamed for anything that goes wrong?

My answer to this dilemma is simply, we need to put some distance between us and authoritarian or narrowly sectarian elites in the Muslim world. If they want to work with us, it is up to local elites to make a clear and affirmative case to their people about the benefits of close relations with the United States. We cannot continue to be a political steam valve, taking onto ourselves the unpopularity of others. In the short-run, this would lead to at least some disengagement from the region, and we’d have to be prepared to mitigate the consequences in terms of energy flows and such.

So, in short, if I were President, I would initiate two processes: First a serious effort to construct a new international legal framework regarding rights and obligations of states to combat transnational terrorism. And second I would end the ability of rulers in the Muslim world to free ride politically on the United States. Obviously, there are many, many moving parts in both these proposals, but in a general way this is the direction I would propose following.

Specifically where you would draw the line between an enemy organization and something else (so as not to encompass, as you say, any Muslim group who might wish us harm). How would you view a group like the Muslim Brotherhood, or the Islamic Action Front in Jordan?

I would not include those in my assessment. Indeed, from my perspective, even groups like Hamas and Hezbollah are borderline given their relative lack of anti-American violence over the past decade.

That said... when looking at the data it is hard to disaggregate groups that are explicitly Islamist and violent. So, in our reports, we try, to the extent possible, to avoid bringing out own judgments into it. If the database codes a group as Islamist and we have attacks in the database, we report out an incident of terrorism.

Measuring attacks by violent jihadists is, thus, a bit broader than the special threat of anti-American violent jihadism. But that is my policy distinction, and I try not to enforce it on others.

Stepping back and looking at the larger strategic picture, do you think that Islamist groups (violent or not) are necessarily inimical to U.S. interests? I'm thinking of the IAF for example, and the fact that some have noted that Islamists may be the only credible group in the region with a commitment to political and even "democratic" (loosely used) reform. Should we be actively encouraging/discouraging their political growth? Staying out of the debate completely?

In a sense, I think the answer is yes. Inevitably, I think, Islamist groups are going to have issue with the existing global order, and since the U.S. is associated with the status quo, there is clearly a tension. But the issue is what you do about it. The world is a messy place, and in many cases, I think you are better off with a hands-off approach. We have come to confuse democracy as a process with liberalism --in the classical sense -- as an outcome.

We may not like the results of elections, but we can't be seen as blocking elections either. Our best case, in many views, is to simply be below the radar. The United States may be the "indispensible nation" in some cases, but that does not mean we have to involve ourselves in every issue at all times.

To that end, you speak of the necessity of distancing ourselves from autocratic regimes in the Middle East. Would that mean, for example, withdrawing military aid from regimes like those in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan? Can we bear the strategic costs of a move like that?

No, and I wouldn't argue for that either. What I would do is move to better link our assistance to policy outcomes. The model would be the shift -- incomplete and problematic as it is -- from traditional development assistance to the MCC approach. The problem with Pakistan, for instance, is that we are basically sending over suitcases full of money and hoping for the best. We can do better, and I think we would through more targeted assistance that could both support our policy goals and encourage reform. The problem, of course, is that our "allies" may reject conditions. But then that exposes the hollowness of the current system. We tend to pay others to do what they would likely have done anyway, and we overestimate the influence our assistance provides us.

The tail wagging the dog so to speak.

Yes.

Well as long as we're on the subject of allies, one area I'd like to address is our policy towards Israel going forward.

Okay.

You have said that you don't think Israel is really as much of a motivator of anti-American terrorism as some think, or at least that it's a motivation that would be easily replaced by something else. You've also said you don't think a sustainable peace deal is a realistic possibility.

Right.

Given the contradiction, going back to George McBundy and the 1967 war, between the necessity of having the support of Arab/Muslim regimes in the region, and our support for Israel, if no peace deal is possible, how do we resolve that?

There are a couple of issues here, and I think we need to be clear about our interests and values.

First, Israel is a state within the international system and has a right to exist. Israel is, literally, the only country in the world that is regularly asked to enter into negotiations in which its very existence is being bargained. And it is the only state that is regularly subject to threats of war from others, who issue these threats with impunity.

Second, the Israeli settlement policy is both criminal and criminally stupid. And as a practical matter, it makes relations between Israel and virtually all other countries problematic.

I think that leads to a policy which says that Israel's right to exist within the 1967 boundaries should be absolute, and that the United States as the leading power in the world ought to be at the forefront in protecting this basic international norm. On the other hand, we simply cannot continue to be essentially complicit in the settlement policy.

The result is a bit odd. It means, I think, we need to look quite carefully at continued assistance to Israel as long as the settlement policy remains unchanged and as long as there is a policy of de-facto territorial expansion by force of arms. So that suggests limiting the U.S.-Israel relationship. On the other hand, we should be even stronger in supporting its core survival. The United States, for instance, ought to be moving to have Iran removed from the UN until Iran explicitly repudiates threats against Israel.

But, here is the problematic part. I think we should be fully committed to a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza determined by plebiscite, but we should realize that when we do that, the result will almost inevitably be a state against whom we will likely have to take action when it threatens Israel proper.

So, it is not sellable as a policy. But, ultimately, I think we need to ensure there is a Palestinian state that comes into being that can then be held to international obligations. Because right now, the Palestinians will say -- not without some justice -- that holding them to international standards without giving them the benefit of statehood is unreasonable.

So, the bumper sticker is -- support Israel more, support the occupation less, and normalize the situation as an inter-state conflict rather than a weird occupation, quasi-statehood situation.

Do you see that as politically realistic within, say, the next decade, or are we talking about another generation or two?

People want the illusion of a comprehensive settlement, so no. I don't think we will be able to sell the notion of creating a likely interstate conflict as progress. I suspect all of this will be overtaken by events in a very nasty fashion rather than being resolved.

Unfortunately it would seem that you aren't alone in that these days.

I just don't see a resolution.

Well on that optimistic note, is there anything else you'd like to add that you think we haven't addressed?

Iraq is looking better, and there is a chance that we can move beyond its poisonous effect on our view of the world. But, no, I think otherwise, we've talked through the big issues.

*Note: This interview was done by email and instant messenger. There have been some minor edits made to address formatting and ease-of-reading issues. No content has been changed.