In The Sights of Russia
Last month, at their summit in Bucharest, NATO bowed to pressure from Moscow and failed to offer paths to membership for Georgia [left] and Ukraine. Instead, they decided to endorse the deployment of an Eastern European-based missile defense system, a longstanding goal of the Bush administration. But, as political analyst Seth Weinberger argued shortly after the summit's conclusion, NATO got its priorities backwards.
Both programs are likely to antagonize Russia, but if NATO was only to get one of the two (missile defense or NATO expansion) it should have gone with NATO expansion. I've written several times about the folly of deploying missile defense systems (quick summary of my view: it's technically possible, but the threat of ballistic missile attack by a rogue state does not justify the massive amounts of money).It certainly has. Not surprisingly, the failure to extend Membership Action Plans to Ukraine and Georgia is a decision that is only encouraging such meddling. Towards Georgia, Russia has adopted a highly provocative approach in the past few weeks. Much to the ire of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, Moscow last month extended diplomatic relations to the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Additionally, it has upped its troop levels in Abkhazia, a region where Russian "peacekeepers" have been stationed since 1992; a Russian plane also recently shot down a Georgian surveillance aircraft over Abkhazian territory. To the authorities in Tbilisi, such actions are a clear provocation.
But NATO expansion is one of the most powerful pacific forces of the post-Cold War era. The transformation of NATO from a security organization to a democratization organization has resulted in democracy becoming entrenched in most of Central and Eastern Europe. Spreading NATO up to Russia's borders will all but ensure that war in Europe is a thing of the past. Both Ukraine and Georgia have shown themselves to be willing and able allies of the US and the West, and Russia has demonstrated a disturbing willingness to involve itself in the affairs of its former partners.
Yet, without NATO's clear backing, Georgia doesn't have many cards to play. It can't adequately threaten military action to remove Russian troops without NATO support, since there is no way its forces could compete against those of its neighbor. Russia, moreover, isn't likely to back down unless international heavy-hitters line up in defense of Georgian sovereignty. This is not likely to happen, of course, as NATO so explicitly announced at its Bucharest summit. Moscow, not surprisingly, has taken advantage of the blood in the water. As the Wall Street Journal notes:
The spark for the latest Russian aggression... [was] Bucharest. Last month, at the NATO summit in the Romanian capital, Germany blocked plans to offer Ukraine and Georgia "membership action plans." Rather than put these democratic countries on the long road to NATO, Berlin preferred to bend to Moscow. Georgia and Ukraine got a vague promise to join NATO one day and to review their "action plan" applications in December. In other words, their fate is up for grabs. The Kremlin can smell Western wobbliness better than most. Within days of Bucharest it pounced on Georgia.No doubt Ukraine is already in Moscow's sights.
4 comments:
Adjara is no longer an autonomous republic.
Jeb,
This is a fascinating topic. I recently wrote a paper on US designs for the ABM shield in Eastern Europe, what it means for the US and Russia, etc. I find this to be a centrally important feature of US foreign policy.
It is interesting that Seth Weinberger (great analyst) has framed the ABM and NATO Expansion priorities as either/or. Perhaps they are in the eyes of the Russian defence/diplomatic establishment, but I haven't seen a big heap of evidence indicating that this is how ABM/NATO Expansion is weighed in Russia.
I am tentatively supportive of the ABM shield, though NATO expansion should take priority if push comes to shove, for all the points you and Seth have made.
The US (and as many of her allies as possible) should make it clear to Russia that its desire for a 'buffer zone' will not be heeded by the international community, and that meddling in the affairs of fledging democracies is not on.
Perhaps it's worth noting that the ABM shield does, in fact, achieve some of the same objectives (though not all) of NATO expansion. It helps to guarantee the security of participating states (i.e., Czech Republic, Poland and presumably a whole host of others, though I don't think the list has been definitively created as yet), and sends a clear signal that the US takes threats to the security of these states very seriously.
ABM can't comprehensively engage participating states the way NATO MAPs can, but some of the security and Atlanticist goals are, in fact, at least partially achieved.
Cheers,
M
James - Good catch. If there were a more updated map, I'd put it up. No luck finding one online, however.
Matt - I think your argument that the West should essentially draw a line in the sand for Russia is a good one. The question for me is: how do we defend that line? In part, it seems, NATO can expand its reach into more of the post-Soviet states. But are there other ways to contain Russian ambitions as well? What other tools are at our disposal?
I'm also concerned that we're moving down a path towards greater confrontation with Moscow. We need to find a way to make our views heard, but also not construct an "us vs. them" relationship that is built on antagonism and mistrust. I wonder if the type of constructive-but-wary relationship we now have with China could serve as a model?
Jeb,
I think that's a pretty astute observation - the difference in managing China vs. managing the Russia seem to be, as you say, the difference between engagement and... less emphatic engagement, bordering on antagonism.
The platforms developed by the US and China to increase transparency in military affairs would probably be a good place to start.
One of the most significant foreign policy failures of the Bush administration has been its relative carelessness/incompetence in shaping public opinion. Hopefully the next administration can bring this key element back into US foreign policy and re-learn how to build broad bases of support for central features of its policy - like containing/engaging Russia.
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