Hugo and What Army? A Show of Force in South America

Politics aside, I hope we can all agree that Hugo Chavez, Latin America's revolutionary de jour, has overreacted to Colombia's cross-border raid into Ecuador against FARC commander Raul Reyes. Whatever one thinks about the legal implications of Colombia's airstrikes into neighboring Ecuadorian territory (for which there are plenty of reasons to have objections unless Ecuador were verifiably providing material, logistical, and diplomatic support to the rebel holdouts), the mobilization of his nation's troops along the 2,050 km border with Colombia is an unwarranted, unproductive, and bellicose act on the part of Chavez.

The ongoing problems in Colombia are the result of two overriding factors: the endemic failure of the state to extend Bogotá's jurisdiction to the depths of its territory and the willingness of FARC to take up arms against the central government to achieve political ends. That, combined with the hitherto inability of reconciliation to take hold between the two, is a recipe for recurring struggle in any country.

The bitter disputes between FARC and Bogotá have all but split the nation into two separate governing entities, with the rebel group having carved out its own, albeit small, enclave in the southeastern part of the country (supported by its extortionist and drug smuggling revenue). The differences are political - FARC is the armed wing of Colombia's communist party - but the situation has gradually morphed into a seemingly endless low-intensity conflict.

Where Venezuela fits into this equation is murky, notwithstanding Chavez's recent hostage mediations between FARC guerrillas and Colombian President Alvaro Uribe. As Anastasia Moloney notes, Colombian-Venezuelan relations have been on a downward spiral recently; this imbroglio certainly marks a new low. While Chavez surely mourns the loss of an ideological counterpart in Reyes, its unclear what he seeks or anticipates to gain with the military posturing. In contrast, what is clear is the implications of the current standoff and what it could mean for the two development-focused countries.

Fear of the disruption of trade, which has become an increasingly stabilizing factor in Latin American relations, can hopefully play a role in pulling Caracas and Bogotá back from the brink. In 2006, Venezuela was Colombia's second largest export destination, accounting for 11.4% of Columbian exports, while Venezuela accounted for 5.6% of Colombia's imports. On the other side, 10.2% of Venezuela's imports come from Colombia. Perhaps realizing just what is at stake and what could result if an outbreak of war does occur will force cooler heads to prevail.

The rationalist theory of war holds that states go to war when they deem that it is in their interests to do so and only when they perceive that there is more to lose by not going to war. Whatever the differences between Colombia's Uribe and Venezuela's Chavez, the recourse to force in the Andes is fundamentally not in the interest of either country (or Ecuador, for that matter).

Meanwhile, Chavez is inadvertently crafting a situation in which he actually has a good bit to lose even if war doesn't break out. Suppose his show of force results in Venezuela's standing down without first achieving "concessions" from Colombia (presumably in the form of Bogotá publicly ruling out incursions into Venezuelan territory chasing FARC members or unconditionally reaching out to Caracas for diplomatic talks to lessen the tension). If that's the case, then Chavez will have overplayed his hand: not only would the move look weak in the short term, but it undermines the credibility of similar Venezuelan threats to come. The lack of a clearly stated rationale behind the mobilization - and an achievable one for Venezuela at that - is yet another risk in this regard. Of course, Uribe simply calling Chavez's bluff and/or being the one to publicly maintain dignity throughout the course of affairs would easily do the trick as well.

In any case, I don't see much that bodes well for the interim future in the region. Uribe's government in Bogotá will continue to have deeply rooted political problems with FARC. And if it is able to prove that Chavez has an operative relationship with FARC, then Colombia-Venezuela relations are headed nowhere but south. Finally, if all three states involved in this spat - Ecuador, Venezuela, and Colombia - do not restore diplomatic relations with each other in the wake of the standoff and reap the benefits that would provide, there's reason to fear that there could only be more bickering to come.

***UPDATE: Two of my favorite blogs, Security Dilemmas and Arms and Influence, both have excellent write-ups on the situation.

Venezuela has "announced that it would halt cross-border trade with Colombia." Colombia doesn't appear to be taking Chavez's bluster too seriously. Bogotá, however, is facing the serious threat of regional isolation while Ecuador is trying to shore up support for sanctions against Colombia.

And the FT has this good tidbit:

While Mr Chavez’s order to send tanks and fighter jets to the Colombian border had the aura of a declaration of war, few are taking the threat seriously. Analysts say Venezuela’s army would be no match for an adversary with 254,000 people on active service – more than twice the size of Venezuela’s 115,000-strong force – who have been in permanent training for the past four decades in a war against various insurgent groups.

“This is just another of Chávez’s orders made without thinking, and without any military advice,” said Miguel Aparicio, a retired general and security analyst in Caracas. “We are getting used to his impulsiveness and instability – it is an empty threat.”

Mr Chávez’s rhetorical bluster is notorious. Only last month, he caused turmoil in the financial and commodities markets when he threatened to stop exporting oil to the US. A week later, he retracted his words.

But the reality remains that, despite recent US warnings that Venezuela has been equipping itself with “three or four times” the amount of weapons that it needs, a lack of experience and practice puts Venezuelan forces at a serious disadvantage.

“Chávez has spent a lot of money on expensive [military] toys, it’s true, but instead of serious training, soldiers seem to spend much of their time carrying out tasks like manning government market stalls,” said Mr Aparicio, in reference to Mr Chávez’s policy of giving the military an increasing role in civil society.

“There is not going to be any war with Colombia. The actions of Venezuela and Ecuador are preventative, to block any possible move by Colombia – but Colombia has already retreated,” says Ana María Sanjuán, director of the Centre for Peace and Human Rights at the Central University of Venezuela.

“What was Colombia’s objective? I think it has a lot to do with the humanitarian exchange,” she said, suggesting that Colombia’s aim might have been to prevent any further involvement for Mr Chávez in the resolution of Bogotá’s ongoing hostage crisis.

***UPDATE 2: El fin.