The Ethnic Dimension of Kenya's Conflict

With the turmoil over Kenya’s election having claimed over 330 lives by some estimates, and in light of particularly brutal murders like those of 50 people torched in a church in Eldoret, media accounts of the conflict are increasingly focused on the importance of ethnicity in Kenyan society. Though initial reports focused on the political dimension – following a likely fraudulent election, supporters of President Mwai Kibeki were clashing with supporters of opposition candidate Raila Odinga – commentators soon picked up on the fact that most of Mr. Kibeki’s supporters are, like the president, from the Kikuyu ethnic group, and most of Mr. Odinga’s are Luos, as Mr. Odinga is. Last night Jim Lehrer characterized the violence as a contest between “rival ethnic groups” without even mentioning the election. CNN Exemplifies this kind of coverage with a story, titled “Tribal Bonds Color Kenyan Politics,” that purports to demystify the all-important ethnic tangle that plagues Kenya.

But if ethnicity is really the sine qua non of Kenyan politics, why didn’t it feature more prominently in pre-election reporting? Are we to believe that the Economist’s usually savvy-if-snide reporters just didn’t know Kikuyu from Luo when they noted in a December 19 story on the election that “jobs and corruption are the issues in a close-fought contests to be president”? Not quite. In truth, ethnicity is an important factor in Kenyan politics, but it is not as important as the ongoing tumult suggests, and at this point need not translate into a drawn out ethnic war.

Most victims of the recent violence have been Kikuyus, the largest ethnic plurality in Kenya at twenty-two percent of the population. Many of the perpetrators are Luhyas and Luos, fourteen percent and thirteen percent of the population respectively. In response to the initial spate of violence, the Mungiki, a pseudo-religious Kikuyu radical group, have been murdering Luos in Nairobi.

Of course, it’s no coincidence that the violence has all occurred along ethnic lines. But the link between old ethnic cleavages and recent violence is not direct. Rather, party affiliation falls on mostly ethnic lines (as it does in many countries that survive elections unscathed), and the violence is in response to discrepancies in the political process (as it is in many countries where political divisions don’t reflect ethnic divisions).

The difference between this and more insidious ethnic conflicts is not just semantic. Contrast Kenya’s situation with Iraq’s: In Iraq, mistrust among ethnic groups made inter-ethnic political cooperation impossible, which in turn made violence likely. The Hussein regime was so explicit in its sectarian character that Iraqi Shiites could not rise to prominence in any capacity in the country. In Kenya, Kikuyus, Luhyas and Luos cooperated in the National Rainbow Coalition, the umbrella political party that defeated the incumbent president, Daniel Arap Moi, an ethnic Kalenjin in 2002. And though Kikuyus enjoy more power and prosperity than other groups, Mr. Odinga’s personal and political fortunes exemplifies how wealthy members of other ethnic minorities can nonetheless become.

Oddly enough, Kenya’s history of political violence might be the best reason to hope that political strife will not become all out ethnic war. In 1997, opposition parties’ failure to dislodge Mr. Moi’s government led to smaller-scale violence. But importantly, the parties of Messrs. Kibaki and Odinga were both involved in that opposition effort, and the two continued their cooperation until the National Rainbow Coalition's 2002 victory.

So why the violence now? The enormity of the opposition’s grievances make the complaints of post-election rioters in other countries look paltry. Corruption is rampant, infrastructure is lagging behind where it could be, and though the service sector is doing well, industry is growing too slowly to create the jobs that it could. Moreover, it is almost certain that a free election would not have returned Mr. Kibeki to power. The most authoritative pre-election poll gave Mr. Odinga a strong lead. And though the Kikuyu have not suffered the indignity of seeing an ethnic compatriot robbed of electoral victory, Kenyans of all creeds are worse off for the governments failures. So while there may be some resentment among the country’s 40-odd ethnic groups (especially towards the privileged Kikuyu) and while Kenyans seem likely to vote for candidates who share their ethnic background, ethnicity is clearly not the be-all and end-all of Kenyan politics, nor of the current strife.

None of this is to diminish the severity of the fighting, nor the gravity of the underlying crisis. But ethnic conflict is more damaging and self-perpetuating than political violence. The greatest threat to Kenya now is the possibility that media attention on the ethnic dimension of the conflict will make it easier for political entrepreneurs to start making ethno-nationalist claims, a development that would quickly turn this political row into a true ethnic war.