The Logic of the Obama Plan...(Or, Why Security Guarantees Matter)

The New York Times ran a front-page article today about Obama's plan to aggressively pursue diplomacy with Iran over the nuclear issue. The approach that Obama detailed is quite logical: unconditional negotiations, better carrots, harsher punishment for non-compliance, and a reduced American presence in the Persian Gulf. This is very much the type of common sense approach that we've called for here on this blog; unfortunately, not everyone in the blogosphere had such a favorable opinion.

Ed Morrissey, a well-known conservative blogger who writes at Captain's Quarters, expressed his disapproval with the plan by suggesting that it is nothing that hasn't been tried before:

...it's hard to believe that neither Obama nor Michael Gordon or Jeff Zeleny recall that the EU-3 and the US made precisely that offer to Iran in the summer 2005 round of negotiations between the Europeans and Iran. The Bush administration even made the offer publicly in support of the European peace initiative, and even talked openly of restoring diplomatic and trade relations with Iran.

Did it work? No, it did not. Iran had more interest in pursuing nuclear weapons than in WTO membership or normalized relations -- because Iran considers itself at war with the United States. It doesn't want normal trade; Iran wants regional hegemony over the Middle East, after which it can demand trade on whatever terms it likes with the entire world.

Actually, Obama's plan is not a repeat of the 2005 proposal. Indeed, Morrissey's analysis failed to recognize one of the most important elements of the Obama plan: security guarantees. Unlike the 2005 EU3 offer, which did not include a specific non-aggression pact from Washington, Obama's approach would effectively eliminate many of the key security concerns of the Iranian regime. Dave Schuler, over at the Glittering Eye blog, sensibly argues this same point:

With all due respect to Ed Morrissey, what Sen. Obama is proposing is not a rerun of offers made in 2005. The part that caught my eye in the article in the NYT are the words “security assurance”. To the best of my knowledge that’s a dramatic departure from present U. S. policy with respect to Iran.

Schuler's right - Obama's emphasis on security guarantees would represent a significant and important change in American policy. As The Washington Post reported last year, the Bush administration has consistently refused to offer "a guarantee against attacking or undermining Iran's hard-line government in exchange for having Tehran curtail its nuclear program." Condoleezza Rice, in May of 2006, affirmed this point: "Iran is a troublemaker in the international system, a central banker of terrorism. Security assurances are not on the table."

But a non-aggression pact from Washington could actually make all the difference in the success of these negotiations. Here's why it might sway the Iranians on the question of enrichment:

First, security guarantees means energy security. Rhetoric about Iran's plentiful oil supplies is convenient for both Tehran--because it encourages faith in energy exports--and for Washington--since it suggests that the Iranian enrichment program is all about arms. But Iran still has to import energy, and there's still reason to believe claims from Qom (perhaps less so from Tehran) that Iran's nuclear program is for civilian purposes. Iran's fear of sustained conflict with the United States predates the escalated rhetoric about invading to stem nuclear research. So the idea that Iran's energy supplies could be devastated by U.S. sanctions and wartime measures may be a major driver for Iran's enrichment efforts. Ahmadinejad's nonsense aside, assuring energy security might undercut clerical support for a costly (politically and fiscally) program.

Second, security assurances, which will have to include assurances against certain sanctions, make Iran a more appealing trading partner to the rest of the world would you invest in a country on the low end of the veep's 'naughty' list?). Security assurances are likely to enhance Iran's economy, which could stem discontent with the Iranian regime. In the longer term, security assurances may mean latitude for negotiating formal diplomatic ties, and enhanced economic ties with the United States. Trade with the United States, Great Satan that it may be, would deflate Iranian dissidents who get a lot of mileage out of claiming that only regime change will bring U.S. trade and the economic boost likely to come with it (which is one reason why Iranian dissidents don't want us normalizing ties with Iran, but more on that later).

Third, and by far most importantly, is the elephant in the room: U.S. support for militant groups fighting the Iranian regime, the Jundallah and the MEK. There's no concrete evidence of material U.S. support for these groups, and Iran is too embarrassed by these groups' efficacy to publicize the issue. That being said, Jundallah and MEK pose a real threat to Tehran's control of the Iranian side of Sistan-Belochistan. Presuming that security assurances include cessation of U.S. support for these groups (and maybe cooperation against the MEK), they may sweeten the pot enough for Iran to acquiesce on enrichment.

(Photo Credit: Peter Wynn Thompson, NYT)